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The ‘financial accelerator’ model when applied to households states that shocks to 
household balance sheets (primarily changes in house prices) amplify fluctuations in 
consumer spending by tightening or relaxing collateral constraints on borrowing.  
We construct an alternative model where households also have access to unsecured 
debt, and examine the effect of shocks to house prices on debt-financed consumption 
in this augmented setting. Our alternative model reduces the amplitude of 
fluctuations in debt-financed consumer spending arising from fluctuations in 
household asset values.  The paper tests the applicability of the two models using 
panel data for the United Kingdom that allow us to measure collateral constraints, 
changes in asset values and financial indebtedness at the household level.  
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Housing Wealth and Household Indebtedness: 
Is there a Household ‘Financial Accelerator’? 
 
1.  Introduction 
This paper uses household panel data to explore the relationship between 
changes in house prices and household indebtedness (both secured on housing assets 
and unsecured) in the United Kingdom (UK).  The UK is a particularly good test-bed 
for examining this issue because, as in the United States (US), housing wealth is the 
dominant asset in many household portfolios.  In fact, Banks, Blundell and Smith 
(2003), using comparable UK and US data sets, suggest that the value of home equity 
accounts for 60% of household financial wealth in the UK, almost twice the fraction 
for the US.  Moreover, following the deregulation of the United Kingdom’s mortgage 
lending market in the period 1980 to 1986 (on which, see Muellbauer and Murphy, 
1990; Attanasio and Weber, 1994; and Aoki et al, 2004), UK lending to households 
secured on housing wealth has grown rapidly. 
Rising house prices have been associated with growing equity withdrawal 
from housing in the UK.  Chart 1 confirms that, since the ‘boom-bust’ in house prices 
from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, UK house prices have grown strongly.  It also 
shows that net aggregate ‘housing equity withdrawal’ (HEW) as a proportion of 
household disposable income – calculated by the Bank of England as the difference 
between borrowing secured on housing and investment in housing, tends to follow 
house price changes, albeit with a lag of 2 to 3 years.
1  House price ‘shocks’, with the 
value of nominal secured debt held constant, may thereby amplify the response of 
household consumption spending to changes in nominal incomes – a variant of the 
‘financial accelerator’ model developed by Bernanke et al (1999) (see Aoki et al, 
2004).  The implications of this relationship between house price volatility and 
household indebtedness has been of concern to central bankers, not least the Bank of 
England. 
The upward trend over the period from 1993 onwards in household debt 
secured on housing – primarily mortgages – relative to household disposable income 
                                                 
1 HEW, or ‘mortgage equity withdrawal’ in Bank of England parlance, is defined as the difference 
between net borrowing secured on property (largely mortgages) plus grants, minus purchases of 
houses, home improvement, moving costs and transfers such as land purchases for housing 
development.  See Davey (2001).   3
is illustrated in Chart 2, with growth accelerating in the late 1990s as house price 
growth also accelerated.   It is also noticeable from the chart that unsecured consumer 
debt has risen as a share of disposable income in the same period, albeit at a 
somewhat faster rate in the first part of the period than the second.
2  Unsecured debt 
includes outstanding balances on credit and store cards, unsecured loans from finance 
companies and banks, hire purchase agreements, purchases from mail order 
catalogues and so on.  Financial liberalisation and increased competition in the credit 
supply market have also been important influences underpinning the growth of 
unsecured debt, but it is apparent that the trends in secured and unsecured debt are 
somewhat different over the period.   
Households that are collateral constrained – that is, limited in their secured 
borrowing by low or zero housing equity – are particularly likely to respond to rising 
house prices by increasing their indebtedness in order to finance consumption.   
Recently Campbell and Cocco (2006), using a ‘quasi-panel’ of UK households, have 
argued that there is a very strong relationship between changes in house prices and 
household consumption in the UK, with implicit elasticities of 1.3 to 1.9 of 
consumption changes to house price changes, which, for average values of housing 
wealth and consumption, translate into a marginal propensity to consume out of 
housing wealth of between 0.8 and 1.2 (ibid, p.11).  This range of parameter estimates 
is very much in line with estimates derived from more structural models in which 
household consumption growth is directly linked to the ability of households to 
increase their debt by securing it on the value of their house – for example it happens 
to be exactly the range of parameter values derived from aggregate Euler equations of 
the impact on consumption of housing prices using US data by Iacoviello (2004).   
The starting point of the present study therefore is to examine the extent to 
which the observed co-movement in house prices and debt-financed consumer 
spending might be attributed to the collateral role of housing.  This study then makes 
two new contributions. First, it augments the collateral constraint model of debt-
financed consumption by explicitly modelling the role of unsecured debt as an 
alternative to secured debt. If households are able to borrow on an unsecured basis, 
then unsecured debt is a potential substitute for secured debt. It is then straightforward 
                                                 
2  Unfortunately, a major change in definitions of secured and unsecured debt in the Bank of England 
data in 1993 preclude an examination of trends over a longer period.   4
to demonstrate that the collateral role for housing is weakened and house price shocks 
will have a smaller effect upon consumption. The relationship between changing 
household wealth and the growth of total debt-financed consumption of households is 
then less clear-cut than is suggested by the basic ‘financial accelerator’ model. This 
phenomenon of debt substitutability is not captured by structural models of the 
household financial accelerator nor estimated in existing empirical studies using 
aggregate series or household data.  
Second, whereas previous studies have instrumented the collateral constraint 
using either an excess-sensitivity test (as in Campbell and Cocco, 2006) or an 
indicator of aggregate credit market conditions (as in Aron and Muellbauer, 2006), we 
directly measure the evolution over time of household-specific loan-to-value ratios 
using self-reported responses about house value and calculated outstanding mortgage 
debt.  Moreover, in contrast to previous studies on the relationship between housing 
and consumption in the UK, we estimate the impact of house prices directly on 
changes in total  household indebtedness (including unsecured debt) rather than 
consumption.  
The panel dimension of our data is crucial for our empirical work. Using a 
panel of UK households, the British Household Panel Survey, which collects annual 
data on housing wealth and secured debt, and detailed information on financial assets 
and unsecured debt in two waves – 1995 and 2000, we can observe heterogeneity in 
responses to household-specific collateral constraints relaxing over time.  In contrast 
to the existing literature, we can precisely identify those households which exhibit the 
strongest responses to rising house prices. 
Our approach and main results are as follows.  Section 2 briefly summarises 
the literature underlying the relationship between housing wealth, consumption and 
indebtedness.  We differentiate models that rely on a pure wealth effect of house price 
‘shocks’ from those where the ‘route’ is through house price changes relaxing or 
tightening collateral constraints.  There are in contrast a few papers that consider only 
unsecured debt, in which alternative mechanisms to a collateral constraint are required 
to limit household borrowing.  Most of the literature considers either secured or only 
unsecured debt, or assumes that secured and unsecured debt are implicit 
complements.  In contrast, we outline heuristically a model where secured and 
unsecured debt are substitutes, not complements, allowing households at the limit of   5
their secured debt capacity to unbind a potential collateral constraint.  This model 
serves to weaken the ‘financial accelerator’ effect of changes in collateral values. 
In Section 3, we examine the evidence from our data on the fraction of 
households that are collateral constrained.  We show, using measures of loan-to-value 
ratio and net household wealth, that only a relatively small proportion of households 
fall into this category.  We contrast this finding with assumptions made in other 
studies and address why we obtain it.  We also show in this section that use of 
unsecured debt is a pervasive phenomenon among UK households, that access to 
unsecured debt is not dependent on the value of collateral; and that controlling for life 
cycle effects, demographics and proxies for preferences, collateral-constrained 
households use unsecured debt more than unconstrained households. 
In Section 4 we consider the impact of house price shocks.  We show that 
households re-mortgage (increase their secured debt) in response to the relaxing of 
collateral constraints by house price increases if they previously had high holdings of 
unsecured debt – this suggests that households primarily use changes in wealth values 
to rebalance their debt portfolio towards lower-priced secured debt.  We also calculate 
the aggregate net effect on total debt from house price changes.  Not surprisingly, 
given the relatively low fraction of collateral-constrained households and the way in 
which households on their constrained margin substitute unsecured for secured debt, 
we find that the macroeconomic consequences of house price changes on debt-
financed consumption are considerably smaller than those obtained by studies using 
time series and cross-section methods based on widespread collateral constraints.  We 
estimate an average aggregate marginal propensity to increase household net 
borrowing in response to an increase in house prices of around 0.03 – varying from 
almost 0.4 for highly levered households to zero for households with very low loan-
to-value ratios.  We consider how this conclusion ‘fits’ with other studies that find 
much stronger relationships between changes in housing wealth and consumption and 
consider alternative explanations in our concluding section. 
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2.  Previous literature, and secured and unsecured debt 
2.1.   Existing theory and evidence 
The existing literature draws two links between changes in house prices and 
household consumption.  The first is that ‘surprises’ to the value of housing wealth (or 
indeed to other financial assets) shift the intertemporal budget constraint and induce 
households to change their consumption, in line with the standard LCH/PIH model of 
consumption (for representative studies on housing wealth for the US using household 
data, see Bhatia, 1987; Case, 2000; Carroll, 2004; Engelhardt, 1996; Skinner, 1989; 
recent studies for the UK include Attanasio et al, 2005, Campbell and Cocco, 2006; 
Disney, Henley and Jevons, 2003).   
Measured housing wealth-induced effects on household consumption through 
this ‘route’ may be rather small in practice for two reasons: first, because of 
measurement errors in modelling ‘shocks’ to housing wealth as residuals from some 
autoregressive process, and secondly because of redistributive effects insofar as the 
wealth gains to potential home ‘downsizers’ (primarily households later in the life 
cycle) will be offset by the adverse impact on potential ‘upsizers’ (such as young 
renters and first-time homeowners).  For the UK, Campbell and Cocco (2006) 
estimate that the elasticity of consumption to ‘surprises’ to housing wealth is 0.5 – far 
lower than their elasticity of changes in consumption to average changes in house 
prices described in the earlier section and implying a much lower marginal propensity 
to consumer out of housing wealth of around 0.03.  The other cited UK studies find 
similar, or even lower (and less precise) estimates.  Moreover, Campbell and Cocco’s 
prediction that older homeowners should have higher consumption responses to house 
prices shocks is contradicted in the study by Attanasio et al (2005).  
The second ‘story’, which is our main focus here, arises because households 
(potential borrowers) and lenders have asymmetric information on default risk that 
induces lenders to require the posting of collateral as a pre-requisite to lending money 
to homeowners (as in Bernanke et al, 1999).  Since housing wealth is the dominant 
source of collateral available to households, changes in housing wealth affect the 
borrowing capacity of impatient consumers (that is, households which have borrowed 
up to their ‘collateral constraint’).  In this setting, there may be excess sensitivity of 
debt-financed consumption to changes in house prices among such consumers   7
because the changes in nominal values of income and wealth contrast with a fixed 
nominal value of mortgage debt. The process by which changes in housing wealth 
have a disproportionately large impact on consumption through tightening or relaxing 
collateral constraints is sometimes termed the ‘financial accelerator’ (as in Aoki et al, 
2004) although in GE-models with firms and households there may be both financial 
accelerators and ‘decelerators’ at work (Iacoviello, 2005). 
There is now a rapidly expanding number of studies on household 
consumption and housing wealth which utilise collateral constraint models to 
rationalise the observed relationships  (see inter alia: Alemeida et al, 2005, Aoki et 
al, 2004, Calza et al, 2006; Iacoviello, 2004, 2005; Lamont & Stein, 1999; Ortalo-
Magné and Rady, 2006).  To our knowledge, almost all these studies use calibration 
methods, aggregate data or cross-region or cross-country panels in order to investigate 
the implications of collateral constraints.  Perhaps surprisingly, few if any of these 
studies have made serious efforts either to measure either the pervasiveness of 
collateral constraints using data drawn from household surveys, or the association of 
(changes in) collateral constraints with (changes in) secured household debt rather 
than total consumption, although the link between household-specific collateral and 
indebtedness is central to the ‘financial accelerator’ hypothesis.
3   
There is a further, theoretical, issue.  In the imperfect capital market literature, 
potential borrowers generally face a spectrum of contracts with different interest rates, 
depending on how much collateral they can offer (as in, for example, Bester, 1985; 
and Milde and Riley, 1988).   Thus there is not a single ‘collateral constraint’ but 
rather a non-linear budget constraint over which agents face different marginal 
interest rates according to their desired borrowing (determined by preferences given 
characteristics) and their asset structure.  Specifically, households can borrow both 
secured against their property and unsecured.  Much of the existing literature using 
the household ‘financial accelerator’ either assumes that unsecured borrowing is 
prohibitively expensive, or contingent on secured borrowing.  If neither of these 
                                                 
3 There is some analogy with the evolution of the investigation of liquidity constraints.  It initially used 
aggregate data and/or simulation methods – whereas later investigations by Jappelli and Pagano (1989) 
utilised cross-country household data to investigate the pervasiveness of such constraints.  However 
there are intrinsic difficulties in measuring the extent of liquidity constraints across households – see 
Duygan and Grant (2006) for some cross-country evidence – whereas collateral constraints are in 
principle much easier to measure.  
   8
statements is true (as we show to be the case in the UK), then the impact of house 
price changes on debt-financed consumption is not the same as in the simple secured 
debt-only case.  
There is an alternative, and smaller, literature that focuses on unsecured debt 
and household consumption, as in Chatterjee et al (2005).  Here, the constraints on 
household borrowing stem from the supply side – that is, the threat of default risk 
limits the supply of credit to any household (see also Gross and Souleles, 2002).  The 
unsecured debt literature models the sources of default risk and the optimal strategy of 
credit providers.  It has been argued that a model in which there is simply a ceiling on 
the supply of credit to any household, rather than one specific to its structure of asset 
holding, provides more straightforward modelling and testable predictions (Kehoe and 
Levine, 2001) – in contrast, the introduction of default risk into the standard collateral 
constraint model of debt-financed consumption complicates the predictions of a 
financial accelerator (Elul, 2006).  In general, a model in which access to unsecured 
debt is dependent on having some form of collateral but is not (positively) related to 
the value of that collateral seems to accord more closely with the facts of household 
indebtedness – see below for further discussion.  
2.2.   Secured and unsecured debt 
Two rationales are generally given in the financial accelerator literature for 
emphasising secured rather than unsecured debt in the household’s balance sheet: 
first, that the value of secured debt far outweighs the value of unsecured debt, and 
second, that interest rates on unsecured debt are typically higher than on secured debt. 
It is surely correct that secured debt predominates in the household’s overall 
debt portfolio, insofar as the largest debt-financed purchase that a household will 
make is likely to be its first and perhaps subsequent house purchases.  However 
households inevitably use unsecured borrowing far more frequently in their lifetime 
than secured borrowing to finance lumpy purchases.  It is sometimes also argued that 
even these purchases are collateralised, if not by housing wealth then by the good 
purchased on the loan such as an automobile, white goods, etc. Typically, for 
example, the US literature treats automobile loans as ‘collateralised’ by the value of 
the automobile purchased.  Iacoviello (2004) states:   9
“Consumers are actually inundated by offers of car loans, credit cards, 
home equity loans, and so on…Most of these loans require the borrower 
to post some collateral.” (ibid, p.305) 
Home ownership is indeed often a key variable used in credit scoring of 
households that are trying to obtain access to unsecured debt.  Unlike other assets, 
houses generally appreciate in value.
4  Home ownership is associated with lower 
residential mobility than tenancy (a key attribute in obtaining a good credit ‘score’) 
and indicates other household characteristics such as potential stability of the 
household structure, prospective job tenure etc.  In addition, a mortgaged property 
signals that the household has previously been successful in obtaining credit.  In the 
UK context, the positive relationship between home ownership status and access to 
unsecured debt stems from credit scoring methods rather than indirect collateralisation 
of unsecured debt (Bridges, Disney and Henley, 2006).  We show in the next section 
that access to unsecured debt typically depends on the household having some 
collateral but not on the value of that collateral.   
As to interest rate differentials, Chart 3 demonstrates that, in general, the 
average differential between interest rates on unsecured and secured loans has 
significantly diminished in the UK in the past 15 years.  Interest rates on secured 
mortgages have fallen slightly but have remained broadly stable given general price 
stability over much of the period.  UK mortgages are predominantly variable rate and 
track nominal interest rates, although term-fixed and discounted rates are also 
common on new loans.  Refinancing or changing mortgage conditions often incurs a 
flat rate fee.   
As the chart also shows, interest rates on unsecured loans from banks and from 
finance companies have diminished over the period, reflecting increased competition 
and greater sophistication in credit scoring.  However, unsecured loan interest rates 
are typically much more heterogeneous across customers and, with the growth of the 
sub-prime loan market, the market has widened to incorporate higher risk borrowers, 
so that this composition effect of greater risk diversity has partially offset the 
downward trend in average rates.  Finally, although credit card interest rates still 
                                                 
4   Loan terminations that involve return of other assets, such as cars, white goods and household 
effects are generally not welcomed by loan companies in the UK – the trade resale values of such 
assets are generally low and they are not effectively treated as ‘collateral’.   10
remain significantly higher than rates of secured debt (despite the significant fall in 
the early 2000s illustrated in Chart 3), increased competition has tended to eliminate 
charges for card ownership and other transactions costs.  Moreover, much of this 
credit is revolving credit.
5  The pervasive use of unsecured credit and the reduced 
differential between interest rates on secured and unsecured debt over time suggest 
that the demand for unsecured debt should be incorporated explicitly into the model 
and not treated as an adjunct to secured debt. 
The standard collateral constraint model is formalised in Appendix 1 to this 
paper.  The implications of the model – in particular the implied ‘financial accelerator 
– can be illustrated graphically.  In Figure 1, denote consumption by c, income by y, 
net financial assets (cash-in-hand) by a, units of housing held by h and price per unit 
of household v, and periods are denoted by t, t+1.  The household can borrow secured 
against its housing wealth at interest rate r
s, with γ measuring the fraction of the house 
value against which the household can borrow 0<γ<1.
6  The budget constraint has a 
cliff non-convexity where the collateral constraint ‘bites’: that is, the maximum that 
the impatient household can consume in period t is its current income and cash-in-
hand, plus the expected value (to the lender) of the value of its house, discounted at 
the rate of interest on a loan secured on the collateral.  A rise in the house price, as 
illustrated by Δv, allows the household to increase its consumption up to (or within) 
the budget constraint augmented by the higher value of the collateral.  If the value of 
the collateral is higher than per period consumption spending, this gives rise to a 
‘financial accelerator’ stemming from changes in the collateral constraint.
7 
Figure 2 illustrates an augmented model, which underlies the empirical 
analysis in the next section, in which the household on the collateral constraint kink 
point has the opportunity to obtain unsecured debt at rate r
u > r
s. The consumer now 
faces a non-linear budget constraint but can reach an equilibrium solution as 
illustrated here where the marginal utility of consumption is equated to the rate of 
                                                 
5  According to Bertaut and Haliassos (2006), a significant proportion of US consumers do not pay off 
credit card balances even when cheaper finance is available to the household.  The UK evidence 
suggests that this practice is common, but not as pervasive, and that many people are primarily credit 
revolvers (Tudela and Young, 2003).   
6  In the Appendix, we assume without loss of generality that γ=1. 
7 A general rise in prices reduces the real value of mortgage debt and increases housing equity.   
However, with variable interest rates, consumer spending on housing will also rise.  This serves to 
dampen any wealth effects but still unbinds the constraint in the manner indicated in Figure 1.   11
interest on unsecured debt.
8  The unbinding of the collateral constraint, as in the 
previous case, allows the household to change its level of consumption spending.  In 
the example of behaviour illustrated here, the household chooses to refinance its debt, 
substituting some debt secured on the higher value of its collateral for unsecured debt.  
The wealth effect arising from the reduction in the average interest rate on its 
borrowing allows it to increase its consumption spending so that the new equilibrium 
can involve no use of unsecured debt (as here), or a higher proportion of secured debt 
in its portfolio, or an equilibrium on the new kink point. Whatever the outcome, the 
net effect on household spending, whilst positive, is dampened relative to the simple 
‘financial accelerator’ model depicted in Figure 1. Indeed where, as in practice, there 
are transactions costs involved in refinancing secured debt, there will be a 
discontinuity at the original kink point in the budget constraint and the household may 
not change its debt structure or debt level at all should the costs of refinancing 
outweigh the gains to be had in reducing the average interest rate of its debt portfolio.  
3.  Collateral constraints and household debt: Empirical evidence 
3.1.     Data 
To investigate these hypotheses, we utilise the British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS), which is an annual panel survey of approximately 10,000 adults in 
around 5,000 households that has been running annually since 1991.  Throughout the 
paper, we work at a household level in which we aggregate housing, debt and asset 
values of the respondent and his or her partner. 
Aside from standard questions concerning household demographics, health 
and economic status, the BHPS asks about wealth and indebtedness in two of the 
twelve waves available at the time of writing: 1995 and 2000.  Respondents in those 
waves are asked to list the sources of household debt, access to unsecured debt 
instruments and the total value of unsecured debt.  This data on the amount of 
unsecured financial debt is collected in two stages.  In the first stage, individuals are 
                                                 
8   As indicated in the discussion in the Appendix, a formal solution of this problem would have the 
household endogenising the kink point in the budget constraint.  There will be several outcomes, 
depending on whether we obtain interior solutions on the segments of the non-linear budget constraint 
or remain at a kink point.  This is not easily tractable analytically for reasonable specifications of 
preferences.  Rather than solve the problem numerically, we use this illustration to motivate the 
empirical analysis of the next section.    12
asked to give a precise value for the total amount they owe.  Individuals who say that 
they do not know how much that they owe are then asked to give a banded answer. In 
this analysis we assign the median for those households who report banded 
information.   
The BHPS in every wave collects information on secured debt, on housing 
status and self-assessed house value.  The questions obtain detailed information on 
mortgaging and remortgaging, as well as year-on-year self-reported house values.   
The mortgage data contains data on type of mortgage, original mortgage value, the 
regular value of mortgage payments, and the current estimated value of the mortgage.  
A key variable in our analysis is the household’s loan-to-value ratio (LTV) since this 
is a direct indicator of whether the household is facing a collateral constraint.   
There are intrinsic difficulties for respondents in constructing current 
mortgage values – whilst annual mortgage statements typically report this statistic, 
those without the information available may attempt to estimate a value from an 
imperfect understanding of how mortgages work.  More fundamentally, we need to 
incorporate explicitly, given the arguments of the previous section, that households 
may use rising house prices to remortgage – in other words the measured change in 
the LTV ratio from 1995-2000 is not an exogenous variable.  To deal with this, we 
also utilise additional data constructed by Andrew Henley at the University of 
Swansea, which predicts current values of mortgages of BHPS respondents derived 
from the reported value of the original mortgage and from details on the terms of the 
mortgage (duration and type of mortgage).  This proxy variable takes out any change 
arising from remortgaging and nets out some of the measurement error.  This 
predicted LTV is used in the analysis where relevant. 
Appendix 2 describes some of these questions in the BHPS on greater detail 
and provides descriptive statistics of the data set for 1995 and 2000. 
3.2.   Which are the collateral constrained households? 
At the heart of the collateral constraint model is the presumption that, for a 
significant fraction of households, the collateral constraint is binding.  For example, 
Aoki et al (2004) assume that the proportion of collateral constrained households in 
the UK is 50%.  In Iacoviello (2004, 2005), the proportions are 25% and 36% 
respectively.  Earlier work by Campbell and Mankiw (1989) differentiating ‘life   13
cycle’ from ‘rule of thumb’ consumers (arguably the latter can be regarded as credit 
constrained) takes 40% as the proportion of the latter in the population.  Many of 
these studies implicitly rely on external evidence of credit constraints from studies in 
the United States such as that of Jappelli (1990) rather than from self-constructed 
estimates.  It should therefore be noted that estimates from US household studies 
generally put the proportion of credit-constrained households at no more than a 
quarter of the population, rely on measures of self-reported credit refusals, and that 
estimates for the United States of credit constraints based on self-reported refusals are 
much higher than for other countries.
9 
Table 1 describes the sample fractions with different loan-to-value (LTV) 
ratios across households in our data for 1995.  Collateral constraints typically bind 
below LTV ratios of 1 and remortgaging is costly.  To benchmark an estimate of the 
appropriate LTV that defines the collateral constraint, according to the Halifax Bank 
(the largest UK mortgage lender), in 1995 its mortgage lending limit to households 
was 90% or 3.5 times household gross income (whichever value was lower). From 
1999 the income multiples limit was abolished in favour of an affordability criterion. 
The Halifax reported an actual average LTV of first-time buyers in 1995 was 0.81.
10  
Among our sample, as Table 1 shows, we calculate that 13% of homeowning 
households had LTVs greater than 0.9 in 1995, and nearly one quarter exhibited LTVs 
over 0.8.  At a LTV ratio of 0.65, we still observe less than 40% of households in this 
category.  Rising house prices between 1995 and 2000 reduced the proportion of 
households in each of these categories still further.  
All this suggests that the typical proportions of collateral constrained 
households assumed in some of the models based on calibration and/or 
macroeconomic data may be too high to fit recent UK experience.  In fact we show 
later that our estimates of the macroeconomic effects of house price changes on 
indebtedness are not too sensitive to the exact cut-off at which we define the collateral 
constraint so long as the constraint is defined as a LTV ratio of at least 0.65. 
                                                 
9   See Duygan and Grant (2006).  Lower self-reported credit constraints for other OECD countries may 
of course simply reflect a greater incidence of discouraged borrowers who do not expect to be offered 
credit, but this finding nevertheless suggests that caution should be exercised in using the self-reported 
incidence of credit constraints.  
10  This information was obtained from correspondence with the Halifax Bank.   14
As an alternative measure of credit constraints, Chart 4 illustrates the 
distribution of household net worth among homeowners in our sample for 1995, 2000 
and averaged over the two years. We calculate net worth as the nominal value of 
housing plus financial assets (cash in hand) plus monthly income minus the value of 
mortgage debt and minus the value of unsecured debt. Only 3-4% of homeowning 
households have negative or zero net worth overall (again, slightly larger in 1995 than 
2000) and 18% of the sample had less than £20000 net worth on average over the 
period.  Again, these are relatively small proportions of the sample of homeowners.
11 
3.3   Collateral constraints and unsecured debt: UK cross-section evidence 
We now consider the evidence from our data set on whether UK households 
are able to use unsecured debt to unbind collateral constraints.  As a preliminary step, 
we examine whether access to, and use of, unsecured debt is related to the value of 
collateral held by households.  
We pool the data from the two waves of the household panel survey which 
contain information on financial debt in order to examine access to various forms of 
unsecured debt among all households.  We use random effects estimators and a 
standard set of controls, including demographics, employment status, qualifications, 
access to social security benefits and proxies for preferences.  The most interesting 
coefficients for our hypothesis are described in Table 2. 
The table shows that owning a home, whether mortgaged or unmortgaged, is 
positively associated with use of unsecured debt instruments in the form of access to 
credit, debit and store cards, borrowing on credit, debit and store cards, owing money 
on unsecured personal loans, and the total value of unsecured debt.  We interpret these 
results as primarily a credit-scoring effect, with debt providers using home ownership 
as a proxy for various dimensions of household stability.  The exception is the 
coefficient for debts on catalogue or mail order purchases, where the coefficient on 
home ownership is negative and insignificant.  Such a means of purchase is very 
much an inferior good, used pervasively by poorer families and those without assets 
(Bridges and Disney, 2004).  Typically, purchases from mail order catalogues do not 
involve any credit screening prior to purchase.    
                                                 
11 Not surprisingly, non-homeowners have much lower levels of net worth: for evidence see Bridges 
and Disney (2004).   15
In contrast, the coefficients on the value of home equity and use of unsecured 
debt are largely negative – higher values of home equity are associated with lower 
values of outstanding debt and use of various unsecured debt instruments.  Only the 
positive coefficient on access to credit, debit and store cards suggests that higher 
collateral values allow access to more debt.  Of course, these are reduced form 
regressions that do not separately permit us to identify supply and demand factors and 
we are likely observing that households with higher asset values demand less 
unsecured debt.  But a plausible reading of the difference in coefficients between 
ownership and the value of collateral is that it is home ownership per se that is 
associated with access to many unsecured debt instruments rather than differences in 
the value of the home. 
The estimates in Table 3 provide an examination of the hypothesis that 
impatient households use unsecured debt to unbind constraints on collateral-based 
lending, as illustrated in Figure 2.  Here, we examine the relationship between the 
underlying loan-to-value (LTV) ratio (that is, with mortgage debt predicted from the 
characteristics and initial value of the mortgage rather than self-reported current 
value) and the value of unsecured debt for both years and pooled across the years.
12  
The Table shows a strong and significant positive relationship between the LTV ratio 
and the size of unsecured debt, exactly as our theory would predict – an interpretation 
of the magnitude of the coefficient is discussed shortly.  The quadratics in income and 
age are also significant and the level term in the value of financial assets is also 
significant in the random effects specification.  Households where the head of 
household is employed are more likely to have more unsecured debt; other variables 
are largely insignificant including the proxies for preferences (‘regular saver’ and 
smoking).  
Table 3 imposes a linear relationship between LTV ratio and the value of 
unsecured debt.  This is consistent with our ‘story’, insofar as when the LTV ratio 
rises, the household can anticipate a greater probability that the collateral constraint 
will bind and it will be forced to access unsecured debt instruments to carry out 
desired borrowing.  However, it seems likely that the probability of the constraint 
binding is low at low levels of the LTV ratio, even when the LTV ratio is increasing, 
                                                 
12   We exclude households reporting more than £30,000 of unsecured debt, which is 1% of the sample, 
and households reporting LTV ratios greater than 1, which comprises 3% of the sample.   16
and that for many households the collateral constraint ‘bites’ well before the LTV 
ratio reaches 1. Therefore we also estimate the model with dummies for decile-banded 
LTV ratios, to seek any non-linearity in the relationship with unsecured debt at higher 
LTV ratios.  The result is plotted in Chart 5, where marginal effects at deciles of the 
LTV ratio from the pooled 1995 and 2000 random effects tobit are illustrated.  Below 
a LTV ratio of around 0.3, the relationship is flat; it is evident from this illustration 
that the collateral constraint begins to bite at LTV ratios of around 0.5 and that at 
LTV ratios over 0.7, there is no apparent increase in unsecured debt. 
Are there other interpretations of the regression relationships depicted here?  
As the descriptive statistics in Appendix 2 make clear, households with high LTV 
ratios are typically younger, with higher values of debt, both secured and unsecured, 
smaller financial assets and faster growing incomes.  The raw differences in LTV 
ratios and debt therefore partly reflect life-cycle factors – however the specifications 
utilised a standard set of control variables such as age, income, assets and family 
composition to control for these factors.  A second possibility is that we are simply 
observing heterogeneity of tastes for indebtedness and therefore a high correlation 
between individual households’ values of secured and unsecured debt.  We argue that 
we control for unobserved preferences in several ways: first by proxies for taste 
shifters (smoker, saving intentions) and second by the fact that the coefficients remain 
robust in the specification in column (3) that allows for random heterogeneity in 
household responses.  In addition the relationship is not linear and in particular is 
broadly flat above a LTV ratio of 0.7 
3.4.   Cross-section results: summary 
To summarise this section, we have show three features of the data: Firstly, at 
most around 25% of households were most likely collateral constrained in 1995, 
given the distribution of LTV ratios and lending limits imposed by lenders at that 
time.  The proportion had fallen by 2000 due to general house price increases over the 
period. Secondly, access to unsecured debt is contingent upon being a homeowner, 
but is available as a substitute rather than a complement to secured debt. Thirdly, we 
show that impatient households unbind their collateral constraint by making use of 
unsecured debt – the constraint appearing to bite sharply at LTV ratios of around 0.7.   17
4.  Relaxing collateral constraints: the effect on household indebtedness 
We now examine how households responded in their remortgaging behaviour 
and total indebtedness to changing collateral constraints between 1995 and 2000.  As 
mentioned in the previous section, results derived from cross-sections of households 
may be attributed to unspecified differences in tastes (heterogeneity) or other 
covariates, rather than to differences in behaviour driven by household-specific 
budget constraints.  In this sub-section, therefore, we further test the models by 
analysing household behaviour as rising house prices over the period relax the 
collateral constraint. As discussed in section 3.1, data on indebtedness are only 
available for 1995 and 2000, so we exploit cross-section variation in long-differences 
to estimate the of the impact of house price changes on remortgaging activity and 
changes in household indebtedness. The period 1995 to 2000 saw a significant 
average increase in house prices (Chart 1) and halved the number of households with 
LTV ratios of at least 0.8 in our panel but this average house price rise (of around 
30% over the period at a time when underlying inflation was close to 2.5% per 
annum) concealed an uneven pattern of house price changes across from UK, hence 
our data exhibits exogenous variation in the degree to which collateral constraints 
were relaxed.
13 
  The financial accelerator model suggests that house prices directly relax 
collateral constraints and so allow households to increase their secured borrowing. 
Our model with unsecured debt suggests that such households will, on the margin, 
substitute secured for unsecured debt, so long as the gain in reduced interest charges 
exceeds the cost of increasing secured debt (administrative fees). This increase in 
secured debt, which is central to both hypotheses, can be measured by the probability 
that the household remortgages over the period. Thus we provide two tests of the core 
issues of the substitutability of secured for unsecured debt. First, we investigate 
whether the probability of a household remortgaging between 1995 and 2000 is 
related to a change in the LTV ratio arising from house price changes over that period, 
and by the level of unsecured debt in 1995. Over 400 households in the sample 
remortgage between 1995 and 2000.  Second, we test whether the change in total debt 
over the period 1995 to 2000 is related to the change in house prices (which relax the 
                                                 
13 For further evidence on the degree of variation in house price changes, see Disney, Henley & Jevons 
(2003).    18
collateral constraint) and to outstanding unsecured debt, focussing in particular on 
collateral constrained households. 
   4.1   Relaxing collateral constraints and remortgaging behaviour. 
As mentioned in section 3.1, the change in the LTV ratio constructed from 
self-reported current values of the house and mortgage is not a good indicator of the 
underlying change in the value of collateral, since the measure incorporates 
behavioural change such as any increase in secured debt that takes place as a result of 
changing house prices.  Consequently we work with changes in the predicted values 
of secured debt derived from modelling the value of the mortgage over time defined 
by the original mortgage contract of each household as the numerator of our changes 
in household-specific LTV ratios, using the changes in self-reported house value as 
the denominator of the ratios. The distribution of these changes by decile is reported 
in Chart 6. 
  In general terms, both models described in section 2 predict a negative 
association between the change in the household’s underlying predicted LTV ratio 
and its probability of remortgaging, most particularly for households with high initial 
LTV ratios: as house prices rise, the LTV ratio falls and households can unbind any 
collateral constraint.  In addition, the model incorporating unsecured debt predicts a 
positive association between the original value of unsecured debt and the probability 
of remortgaging given the change in the predicted LTV ratio. This arises simply 
because the falling LTV ratio allows the household to substitute cheaper secured debt 
for its outstanding unsecured debt.  However, having demonstrated in section 3 that 
households unbind collateral constraints using unsecured debt, we expect that the 
household most likely to remortgage will be those with unsecured debt which they 
seek to refinance rather than those with high LTV ratios but no unsecured debt – our 
assertion being that the latter group are less likely to react to a relaxing constraint by 
increasing borrowing given that they did not use the opportunity of unsecured debt to 
unbind their constraint in the earlier period. 
  Table 4 provides various regressions that explore these possibilities for 
homeowners. All specifications are probit models of the remortgage rate where the 
dependent variable is a dummy variable for whether the household remortgaged at 
least once between 1995 and 2000. The change in the predicted LTV ratio is   19
interacted with dummy variables for values of the LTV ratio and values of unsecured 
debt in order to captured the impact of relaxing collateral constraints on different 
groups – those with high LTV ratios and those with unsecured debt.  The covariates 
include demographic and economic characteristics in 1995 and terms for change in 
income, assets, employment and number of children between 1995 and 2000.  This is 
not a fully specified model of why households remortgage (which includes, of course, 
demographic as well and financial changes) – in particular, we do not use the data on 
self-reported motives for remortgaging in the BHPS (which unfortunately do not 
include explicit motives that could be used to characterise the theoretical models 
described here; more details on responses to the actual questions asked can be found 
in Bridges, Disney and Henley, 2006).  Nevertheless, the results here are, in our view, 
sufficient to provide an empirical vindication of the models described in the present 
paper.  
  Column 1 of Table 4 is our baseline regression. It indicates, as expected, an 
increased probability of remortgaging when the underlying loan-to-value ratio falls. 
Columns 2 and 3 provide a more precise test of the financial accelerator model, since 
the specifications interact the change in the predicted LTV ratio with whether the 
household had a LTV ratio in 1995 indicating that they were collateral constrained 
(taking respectively LTV>0.9 and >0.8 as indicators).  The inference is that the 
probability of remortgaging between 1995 and 2000 as LTV ratios on average fell 
should be strongest amongst households that had high loan-to-value ratios in 1995.
14 
The coefficients on these variables are insignificant and indeed switch sign between 
columns 2 and 3.  Experimentation with alternative cut-off values is unable to verify 
that there is any pure collateral constraint effect on remortgaging arising from the 
level of the LTV ratio at the start of the period.  
Our augmented model suggests that we should include unsecured debt in the 
equation: households may utilise unsecured debt to unbind a collateral constraint and 
therefore use rising home equity to substitute secured for unsecured debt.  When we 
consider households with positive values of unsecured debt (Column 4), captured by 
the interaction between the dummy variable for unsecured debt and change in the 
LTV ratio, the coefficient is significant and negative: households with unsecured debt 
                                                 
14  Note that we do not simply include a term in the size of the LTV ratio in 1995, since it is the 
combination of a falling LTV ratio and a high LTV ratio in 1995 that is the source of the ‘financial 
accelerator’ effect.    20
were 3 percentage points more likely to remortgage for a given change in their LTV 
ratio compared to households without unsecured debt. That the marginal effect on this 
coefficient is small is not too surprising – it may not be optimal for households with 
low levels of unsecured debts to remortgage as the remortgaging cost will exceed the 
benefit in terms of the spread on interest payments from substituting secured for 
unsecured debt.    
This suggests using threshold values of unsecured debt in 1995 > 0 to look for 
a larger impact of unsecured debt on remortgaging.  Columns 5 and 6 therefore 
include interactions for higher threshold values of unsecured debt, at £500 and £750 
respectively.  The marginal effect on these indicators increases substantially, to 0.21 
and 0.23 respectively.  Hence households with a considerable value of unsecured debt 
were much more likely to remortgage over the period – the effect on the probability of 
remortgaging when the LTV relaxes being three times stronger for these households 
compared to the baseline regression.  Finally, since these are non-nested 
specifications, Columns 7 and 8 include both the interaction terms for the level of the 
LTV ratio (at 0.8 and 0.9) and the value of unsecured debt (at £500).
15  In both cases, 
the relative size and magnitude of the coefficients are as before, suggesting that it is a 
combination of falling LTV ratio and ‘high’ unsecured debt that increases the 
probability of remortgaging – being collateral constrained per se does not induce 
remortgaging since such households can exploit unsecured debt to alleviate the 
constraint, as described in Section 3.  Taken together, these results lend support for 
the refinancing model, strongly suggesting that it is the substitution of secured for 
unsecured debt, as in Figure 2, rather than the ‘pure’ financial accelerator model, as 
depicted in Figure 1, that is driving consumer behaviour
16. 
4.2    Relaxing collateral constraints and total debt 
We now consider the impact of relaxing LTV ratios on the level of household 
debt by estimating the impact of changes in housing wealth (which relax the 
constraint) on changes in the level of household debt.   This provides a direct test of 
the proposition that the relaxing of collateral constraints only has a significant impact 
                                                 
15 The correlations between the two interaction terms in columns 7 and 8 are 0.23 and 0.27 
respectively.   
16  A telling statistic is that, although roughly half of the sample had no unsecured debt in 1995, all the 
households that remortgaged between 1995 and 2000 had positive unsecured debt in 1995.   21
on the indebtedness of constrained households – in particular of constrained 
households with unsecured debts – and allows us to quantify that response. Given the 
remortgaging results in the previous section, we would expect to find the strongest 
relationship between house price changes and total debt to be among constrained 
households with high levels of unsecured debt. We again proceed in making the 
distinction between constrained and unconstrained households by choosing threshold 
levels of the household-specific LTV ratio and values of unsecured debt.  We consider 
non-moving homeowners only, since there is a strong likelihood that moving is 
associated with changes in net financial assets associated with home improvement, 
moving costs and so on.
17 18  In some of our specifications, therefore, we correct for 
the non-random nature of non-movers utilising the standard Heckman procedure.  
Table 5 reports estimates of the effect of house price changes on total debt 
(actual, not predicted, secured plus unsecured debt) over the two waves of data. 
Column 1 is our baseline regression. In this specification there is no significant 
relationship between changes in house prices and changes in household indebtedness. 
This in itself is a striking result: despite the correlation between house price and 
equity withdrawal in aggregate series, our results suggest that this correlation is not 
observed across households when we control for household characteristics.  Column 2 
follows the approach of the previous section by interacting the change in the 
household’s house price with a dummy variable for the level of the LTV ratio, here 
using a threshold of 0.8. The results suggest that even for households very likely to be 
constrained there is no significant relationship between the change in the house price 
and the change in indebtedness. As in the previous section, we conclude that 
household’s initially exhibiting high LTV ratios do not respond to rising house prices 
in a significantly different manner to households with lower LTV ratios – a ‘pure’ 
financial accelerator effect does not show up in these estimates. 
                                                 
17 According to the Survey of English Housing, administered by the UK government’s Department of 
Communities and Local Government for 2005-06, 56% of households reporting housing equity 
withdrawal reported that they used it to fund home improvements, 29% reported that they used it to 
reduce debt, and 15% reported that they used it directly to finance household purchases (Source: BBC 
website, November 23
rd, 2006). 
18 We exclude households with changes in unsecured debt over +/-£60,000 (which excludes 2.4% of 
the sample) and households with changes in the house price over +/-£275,000 (which excludes 1.37% 
of the sample). Such households will, most likely, have experienced changes in debt and housing 
values of these magnitudes over the five-year period due to downsizing or receiving inheritances or 
unexpected windfalls.   22
Columns 3-4 test our alternative model with unsecured debt. Here we interact 
the change in the house price with two dummy variables – whether the household has 
a LTV ratio greater than a certain threshold, and whether the household has unsecured 
debts greater than £500. As shown Section 4.1, unsecured debts of £500 or greater 
induce a higher probability of remortgaging among households and we use various 
levels of the LTV ratio to test whether the relationship is stronger for households 
more likely to be constrained given that they have unsecured debts. As we move from 
column 3 to 4 we notice that the coefficient on this interaction term weakens – the 
coefficient in column 3 implying that a household with unsecured debt over £500 and 
LTV ratio over 0.9, which experienced an increase in its house price of £1000 is lead 
to increase total indebtedness by £250 more than a household not in this subset. This 
is a very large response but of course the number of households in this category is 
rather small (Table 1).  As the threshold is lowered to 0.8 in column 4 the number of 
households captured by the interaction term increases and the coefficient on that 
variable falls. Hence we are introducing households for which the relationship 
between changes in the house price and changes in total debt is weaker. 
Chart 7 illustrates a broader set of OLS estimates of the coefficient on this 
triple interaction term from a sequence of regressions where we set the LTV ratio 
threshold at values between 0.65 and 0.95 in 0.05 point intervals. We plot the value of 
the coefficient in each case, which falls as the LTV ratio threshold falls.  Of course, as 
the proportion of households in the dummy variable group rises as the LTV ratio falls.  
A benchmark for the macroeconomic effect of this relationship is to multiply the 
coefficient (we also provide ±  one standard error in the Chart) by the proportion of 
the sample measured as constrained.  For example, at a LTV ratio>0.9, 0.13 of 
households are treated as constrained and the estimated coefficient is 0.25, so the 
average effect is 0.13 X 0.25 = 0.033.  This average effect is 0.03 (± 0.003) in all 
cases until LTV>0.6, where the coefficient is no longer significant. This average can 
be considered the macroeconomic effect of house price gains on debt-financed 
consumption in our sample. 
Columns 5-6 use a selectivity correction for the household being a non-mover 
between 1995 and 2000. The BHPS questions respondents on whether they prefer to 
move work, like their current neighbourhood and whether work commitments prevent 
the household from moving. We use these responses (using a lag of the preference for   23
moving response) as exclusion restrictions in the first-stage regression for whether the 
household is a non-mover over the period. The coefficients on the exclusion 
restrictions are jointly significant at the 5% level. Marginal effects are reported 
conditional upon the household being a non-mover. We see that under this 
specification the strength of the coefficient on the unsecured debt interaction weakens 
by approximately one half and falls with lower thresholds for the LTV ratio, 
consistent with our results in the OLS specification. 
The positive relationship between changes in house prices and indebtedness 
for the groups of households captured by the interaction terms implies that households 
in these subsets do increase their indebtedness in response to house price rises. 
Crucially though, these households had existing unsecured debts in 1995. Hence we 
interpret this increased indebtedness (and consumption) as the wealth effect of 
substituting secured debt for unsecured debt. This is a financial accelerator effect, but 
it occurs via refinancing unsecured debt and is hence weaker than the pure financial 
accelerator effect. 
5.   Conclusion 
 This paper has explored the mechanisms by which house price changes affect 
household indebtedness through tightening or relaxing collateral constraints – most 
familiarly characterised as the ‘financial accelerator’ model.  Changes in asset values 
‘amplify’ or ‘accelerate’ the effect of changes in nominal income on debt-financed 
consumption, in contrast to the rather small effects of house prices on consumption 
generally found through the estimation of traditional ‘wealth effects’ from the 
perspective of the life cycle model.  Empirical support for the financial accelerator 
model come from a variety of sources, including calibrated macroeconomic models 
which assume that there is a large fraction of collateral constrained households, and 
from the excess sensitivity tests of Campbell and Cocco (2006) on UK data, which 
also suggest large responses of consumption to (predictable) changes in house prices.  
We argued that the financial accelerator should be adjusted to take account of 
unsecured debt. On the margin, it is easier for households to adjust unsecured debt 
rather than secured debt, and to unbind collateral constraints by the use of unsecured 
debt. Consequently, the primary means by which changes in collateral constraints 
arising from asset revaluations impact on debt-financed consumer spending is that   24
households substitute cheaper secured debt for unsecured debt, if the gain from lower 
interest payments outweighs the transactions costs of so doing.  This relative price 
effect arising from changing asset values will indeed increase debt-financed 
consumption, but the magnitude of the effect is likely to be much smaller than the 
‘amplification’ of shocks implied by the financial accelerator model.  
We utilise household panel data to examine the financial accelerator model 
and our modification, and also contrast our empirical findings with those of Campbell 
and Cocco, and others.  We find that these studies tend to overstate the fraction of 
collateral-constrained households in the UK, by whatever exact criterion is used to 
define ‘collateral constraint’. Secondly, households with more binding collateral 
constraints (that is, higher self-reported LTV ratios of around 0.7 or greater) do 
indeed have higher unsecured debt once we control for life cycle characteristics and 
for individual heterogeneity. We interpret this result as confirming that households 
can in practice unbind collateral constraints by using unsecured debt. 
We use the panel aspect of the data to show that households exploit relaxing 
collateral constraints to refinance their debt portfolios, substituting secured for 
unsecured debt, and thereby test between the pure financial accelerator model and the 
model with unsecured debt. We show that remortgaging is not associated with high 
LTV ratios per se, but is associated with high levels of unsecured debt, as our 
augmented model suggests. We confirm this by a direct test of the impact of relaxing 
collateral constraints (due to rising house prices in our period) on the value of total 
debt among non-moving households (to abstract from the effect of moving itself on 
holding of financial assets and on consumption).  Our results strongly suggest that a 
relationship between changes in house prices and total indebtedness is only found 
among collateral constrained households who initially exhibit high levels of 
unsecured debt.  
When we consider the macroeconomic effect across the whole sample, our 
results imply an average marginal propensity to increase indebtedness (and thereby 
consumption) of 0.03 – even lower if we believe the selectivity-corrected estimates. 
This is between a third and a quarter of the magnitude of that found by Campbell and 
Cocco, and by calibrated studies using the financial accelerator model.  We show that 
our result is robust to alternative definitions of the collateral constraint. Hence, 
averaged across all households, an increase in the value of housing of £1000 would   25
lead the average household to increase debt-financed consumption by approximately 
£30.  This result is not out of line with estimates derived from a traditional life cycle 
model of the impact of unpredictable changes in housing wealth on consumption.  
However we argue that a ‘collateral effect’ does exist, and is strong for a subset of 
households, but this subset of households is relatively small, implying that the 
macroeconomic effect is actually quite small. 
How do we square this with other evidence?  As indicated in footnote 17, the 
Survey of English Housing suggests that, after housing improvements, households 
report ‘paying off debt’ as the second most important rationale for utilising housing 
equity gains.  This fits with our argument that exogenous housing wealth gains allow 
constrained households to substitute secured for unsecured debt.  It is a greater puzzle 
to reconcile our results with the large effects of UK house prices on consumption 
found by Campbell and Cocco (2006).  One possible counter-argument to our results 
is that we have not fully tested the excess sensitivity model, stemming from Flavin 
(1981) and the subsequent literature.  For example, an observed response of 
consumption to predictable changes in wealth may indicate not just borrowing 
constraints (as described here) but also the existence of buffer stock saving.  So one 
alternative mechanism underpinning their results is that persistently growing housing 
wealth over time allows households to decumulate previously built-up financial assets 
so inducing the consumption response described in their paper. 
A simple test of this hypothesis is to use the panel component of our data to 
test what happens to the financial assets of households as house prices increase.  If 
rising housing wealth allows financial asset decumulation, we might expect a negative 
correlation between household-specific changes in housing wealth and changes in 
financial assets controlling for age (lifecycle effects) and preferences (proxied by 
lagged value of financial assets).  In fact we find no such effect: household financial 
asset levels in 2000 are strongly positively correlated with financial assets in 1995, 
significantly related to a quadratic in age and positively (but insignificantly) 
associated with changes in house values between 1995 and 2000.  Thus the ‘story’ 
where rising asset values relax collateral-constraints seems to be the ‘right’ one but, 
given the small fraction of collateral-constrained households and the mechanism by 
which such households can and do substitute secured for unsecured debt, does not   26
explain why some studies obtain such large consumption responses to housing 
wealth.
19   
                                                 
19    For another response to Campbell and Cocco (2006), see Attanasio et al (2005).   27
Table 1 
Proportion of sample with Loan-to-Value ratio>0.X in 1995 
LTV>0.X  0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.65 
% of sample   0.08 0.13 0.19 0.24 0.28 0.33 0.37 
Total number  127 198 292 372 438 509 578 
 
Table 2 
Unsecured debt and housing equity 






































































Notes:  Value of housing equity = self-reported value of home minus predicted value of current 
mortgage.  Each cell contains, respectively, coefficient, standard error, marginal effect.  **=1% 
significance, *=5% significance.  Controls include: quadratic in household income, in value of 
financial assets, and in age of head of household, gender of head of household, number of children, 
employment and retirement status, total number of social security benefits received, educational 
qualifications and whether head of household saves regularly and is/is not a smoker.   28
Table 3 
Loan-to-Value Ratio and Value of Unsecured Debt 
Specification: Tobit 
LHS Variable: Value 






















































































































































Notes:  Specifications also include constant term and dummies for highest educational 
qualifications, for whether smoker, saver, gender of HofH, other labour market status.  Coefficient 
(standard errors in parentheses) are quoted, not conditional marginal effects.  **=1% level of 
significance; *=5% level of significance.   29
Table 4 
 Remortgaging, Changes in Loan-to-Value Ratio and Value of Unsecured Debt 
1995-2000. (Probits; marginal effects.) 
 
Specification: Probit 
LHS Variable: Prob. of 
remortgaging 1995-2000  
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
























   LTV>0.81995 
- -  -0.001 
(0.04) 
- - - -  0.06 
(0.05) 
ΔLTV ratio1995-2000* 
   Unsecured debt > £01995 
- -  -  -0.03** 
(0.01) 
- - - - 
ΔLTV ratio1995-2000* 
   Unsecured debt >£5001995 







   Unsecured debt >£7501995 




Notes: Coefficient (standard errors in parentheses) are dF/dX.   N=2006.  **=1% level of significance; 
*=5% level of significance. Specifications also include constant term and dummies for highest 
educational qualifications, marital status in 1995 and change in marital status 1995-2000, number of 
children in 1995, whether retired in 1995, and whether female head of household in 1995, number of 
benefits, household income & financial assets squared, whether smoker, saver, gender of HofH, other 
labour market statuses. ΔLTV ratio is the predicted change in the LTV ratio given the original 
mortgage value, and excludes consequences of remortgaging.    30
Table 5 
Changes in Housing Wealth and Household Debt 
 
  OLS Estimates  Heckman Estimates 
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Δself-reported house value1995-2000  
    *constrained1995 
    *unsecured debt 1995>£500     








































































































Notes:  Coefficient (standard errors in parentheses).   **=1% level of significance; *=5% level of 
significance. Specifications also include constant term and dummies for highest educational 
qualifications, marital status in 1995 and change in marital status 1995-2000, number of children in 
1995, whether retired in 1995, and whether female head of household in 1995.  
Note on Heckman specifications: There are 2029 total observations including movers.  We report 
results for non-movers using BHPS questions on whether respondents intend to move (lagged), like 





































































































































































































HEW as % of Y(1-t) Change in house prices
Notes: HEW as % of Y(1-t).  Housing equity withdrawal, as defined in footnote 1, as % of household 
disposable income.  Quarterly changes in house prices are derived from the Nationwide Building Society 
house price index, also used in Campbell and Cocco (2006). 
Debt defined as of % household disposable income. Source: Bank of England online statistics.
Chart 2



























































































































Secured debt as % of Y(1-t) Unsecured debt as % of Y(1-t)














Average Interest Rates: Secured and Unsecured Debt
























































































Credit cards Unsecured personal loans Variable rate secured mortgage
Chart 3 
Chart 4
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Distribution of the change in the predicted 
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Note: Moving 2-band average; pooled data from 1995 and 2000 BHPS waves. 
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Impact of change in LTV on total debt by LTV
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Appendix 1: The collateral constraint and unsecured debt 
As in Iacoviello (2004) and other related models, assume that households maximise 
lifetime utility over consumption and over a flow of services derived from owning a house, 
subject to a lifetime wealth constraint and a per period collateral constraint. Hence the 















⎢ ⎥ ⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
∑        ( 1 )  
where  u is some general utility function, ρ  is the subjective discount factor,  t c  is 
consumption, and  t h  is units of housing.  The household chooses a trajectory of consumption 
and increments (decrements) of units of housing that maximises its lifetime felicity function.  
The household is subject to two constraints: a lifetime budget constraint (2) and a collateral 
constraint on borrowing in any period depending on the lender’s expectation of the price of 
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where yt is income, Y  is lifetime income (wealth),  t v  is the price per unit of housing, 
s
t r  is 
the interest rate on secured debt and 
s
t b  is the value of outstanding secured debt.   
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20   To simplify notation, we assume that the household can borrow exactly the amount of the expected 
value of its collateral, not a multiple or fraction of that value.  The process of ‘financial liberalisation’, 
as occurred in the UK in the late 1970s and several European countries in the 1980s, can be regarded as 
a process by which this fraction, or multiple, is raised. 
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where  1 λ  is the shadow value of the lifetime borrowing constraint and  2 λ  is the shadow 
value of the per period collateral constraint on consumption.  Note that the constraints are 
‘discounted’ at the rate of interest on secured debt,  .
s
t r  
A household with a value of ρ sufficiently low that desired borrowing does not 
exceed the borrowing constraint can be described as an endogenously unconstrained 
household given the rate at which it discounts future consumption.  Hence the Euler equation 
for consumption for such households can be derived in the standard manner: 
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Hence, from the derivation of (5): 
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Alternatively, households with a value of ρ  such that the borrowing constraint binds 
can be termed constrained households.  Solving the problem for constrained households when 
the collateral constraint,  2 λ  binds gives: 
0 ) 1 (
1
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In the extreme case of  ∞ = ρ  the Euler equation is: 
 
  ) 1 ( ) ( ' 2
s
t t r c u + = λ  
The first order condition for housing demand is: 
 









        ( 8 )  
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As  ) ( ' 1 t c u = λ , housing demand is given by: 
 
  21 '( ) '( ) ( ) tt t tt ucv uh Ev λ + =+         ( 9 )  
 
and housing demand of the constrained household is higher than that of the unconstrained 
household as the shadow price of lifting the collateral constraint exceeds the marginal utility 
of consumption in (6). 
It is therefore straightforward to consider the implications of a positive shock to the 
expected value of housing wealth for the collateral-constrained household.  Any alleviation of 
the borrowing constraint, such as arises from an increase in the expected value of housing 
wealth, induces the household to increase current consumption.  The relationship may be 
termed a financial ‘accelerator’ insofar as increase in all values, including income, may lead 
to an increase in current consumption greater than the increase in income because the secured 
debt is fixed in nominal terms, so that borrowing capacity rises faster than nominal income 
growth.   
Unsecured debt 
The introduction of unsecured debt, 
u
t b , to the model provides the household with an 





t r r >  as it is not secured against the homeowners’ holding of housing equity.  So, 
faced with a choice between secured and unsecured debt, we assume that the unconstrained 
household will always choose secured debt.
21 The household’s maximisation problem remains 
as before in equations (1) to (3) although we now add a terminal condition (since we are 
working with an intertemporal budget constraint rather than the flow of funds approach of 
Iacoviello, 2004): 
su
TTT T bbv h +<                          (10) 
This states that outstanding debt at the time horizon cannot exceed the value of 
housing wealth.   
                                                 
21   Thus we leave aside for the present the issue of why households might choose to borrow unsecured 
when they have not yet exhausted their lines of secured credit (see Bertaut and Haliassos, 2006). We 
suggest that this may be because changing the value of secured debt (as household circumstances 
change) may involve significant transactions costs (i.e. remortgaging).  Households may only engage in 
changes in the value of secured debt in the event of major ‘shocks’ such as changes in family 
composition or changes in employment status (e.g. moving job, losing a job or retiring from the labour 
force) or, as the model suggests here, when the overhang of unsecured debt is substantial at a time 
when a collateral constraint is alleviated. 
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Households now face a non-linear budget constraint. We can therefore distinguish 
three kinds of households which differ only in their value of ρ.  One type, with 
−
≤ ρ ρ , are 
either lenders, or borrow less than the collateral constraint. They face an exogenous interest 
rate 
s
t r . A second type, with 
−
−
≤ < ρ ρ ρ , are at the kink point on the budget constraint, 
borrowing up to the extent of their collateral.  An increment of borrowing at the kink point 
will incur the interest rate 
u
t r .  A final type of household, with
−
> ρ ρ , has exhausted its 
collateral constraint and has unsecured borrowing.  The average rate of interest on borrowing 
for this group, r , is monotonically positively related to their level of borrowing given their 
collateral constraint, and monotonically negatively related to their level of collateral given 
their level of borrowing.  This average interest rate is of course endogenous as it depends on 
the household’s holding of housing  t h , which in turns limits secured borrowing, 
s
t b .  We can 
think of the household with a potential collateral constraint solving a two-stage problem in 
which it first solves for the optimal housing quantity, and thereby determines the average 
interest rate at which it can borrow.  It then solves for the optimal allocation of consumption 
over time in the standard Euler equation framework but with a higher average interest rate 
than in the unconstrained case, since part of this borrowing is undertaken at the higher, 
unsecured, rate of interest.  In this modified version of the standard problem of the liquidity or 
collateral-constrained consumer with a non-linear endogenous budget constraint, it is not 
feasible to obtain analytical solutions to the problem for plausible specifications of 
preferences, as is well known in the more standard models.  In the text, therefore, we examine 
whether the empirical predictions of the model (in particular as to the substitutability of 
unsecured for secured debt) are verified.    42
Appendix 2: Questions in the British Household Panel Survey concerning debt and 
related issues (2000 wave unless otherwise stated) 
Unsecured debt instruments: 
 





Respondents are asked ‘about any other financial commitments you may have apart from 
mortgages and housing related loans. Do you currently owe any money on the things listed on 
this card?  Please do not include credit cards or other bills being fully paid off in the current 
month.’: 
 
Hire purchase, Personal loan (from bank, building society, or other financial institution), 
Credit card(s) (including store card), Catalogue or mail order purchase, DSS Social Fund 
loan, Loans from individual, Overdraft, Student loan, Anything else? 
 
In 1995, ‘student loans’ are not separately identified 
 
If owes money 
Asked how much in total is owed?  In nearest pounds, or: 
If don’t know, the following series of questions is asked to determine a band for debt: 
Would it amount too? 
a)  500 or more? (if yes, ask (b), if no, ask (d), 
b)  1500 or more? (if yes ask (c)) 
c)  5000 or more? 




Other financial investments: Respondents are asked how much they hold in: premium bonds; 
unit trusts / investment trusts; Personal Equity Plans; shares (UK or foreign); National 
Savings Bonds (capital, income or deposit); other investments, government or company 
securities. 
Respondents are also asked: ‘Do you save any amount of your income, for example by 
putting something away now and then in a bank, building society or post office account other 
than to meet regular bills?  Please include share purchase schemes and Personal Equity Plan 




Respondents are asked to state the total amount of outstanding loans on all property they or a 
member of their household own.  Respondents who have a mortgage are asked to state the 
size of their last total monthly instalment on the mortgage, the initial value, the type of 
mortgage and its starting date. 
Remortgaging: they are asked whether they have taken out any additional mortgage or loan 
on their house/flat since the last survey and if so, the amount of the additional mortgage. 
 
Housing wealth 
Households who own their home or who are buying it with a mortgage are asked to provide 
an estimate of the current value of their house.   43
Selected descriptive statistics for all heads of households, financial variables in £000s 
 
Variable           Name |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
Unsecured debt 1995           tdebt1 |      2623     1.23234      3.8907          0     99.999 
Unsecured debt 2000           tdebt6 |      2623    1.868872      4.8836          0        100 
Change 1995-2000           tdebt_c |      2623    .6365322    5.331944    -74.999        100 
Self-rep Total debt 1995      totaldebt1 |      2623    25.61265    38.28306      -.009       1003 
Self-rep Total debt 2000      totaldebt6 |      2623    26.71186    43.84358      -.008        800 
Change 1995-2000       totaldebt_c |      2623    1.099208    44.49499  -1003.003        713 
Predicted mortgage 1995             mort_1|      2448    24.37439    26.02393          0   249.6005 
Predicted mortgage 2000              mort-6|      2458    25.13351    33.74402     -39.96   615.2924 
Self-Rep mortgage 1995       mort1|    2623    24.38031    37.38744      -.009       1000 
Self-Rep mortgage 2000       mort6|    2623    24.84299    42.41827      -.008        800 
All owned houses value 1995       tvalue1 |      2621    79.89314    58.72092          2        685 
All owned houses value 2000       tvalue6 |      2481    126.4273    112.9648          3       1076 
Change 1995-2000          tvalue_c |      2480    46.07671    82.61727       -546        918 
Self-reported house value 1995    rhsval1 |      2621    74.31626    50.68138          2        685 
Self-reported house value 2000    rhsval6 |      2481    115.9023    89.47925          3        999 
Change 1995-2000          rhsval_c |      2480    41.22604    62.49619       -546        775 
Financial Assets 1995          asset1 |      2623    14.61443    38.73717          0        830 
               Financial Assets 2000             asset6 |      2623    12.13411    36.69199          0        830 
Change 1995-2000           asset_c |      2623   -2.480324    8.345206     -129.3          0 
Household Income 1995        tincome1 |      2623    20.97394    15.87328          0    297.602 
Household Income 2000        tincome6 |      2623    24.33514    19.81642          0   397.3198 
Change 1995-2000         tincome_c |      2623    3.361197    16.41628  -261.3746   242.7034 
Employed=1 1995             emp1a |      2623    .7662981    .4232654          0          1 
Employed=1 2000             emp6a |      2623     .704918    .4561666          0          1 
Change 1995-2000               emp_c |      2623   -.0613801    .3488664         -1          11 
HofH Gender (male=1)           sex1a |      2623    .6584064    .4743345          0          1 
HofH had Degree 1995 = 1           tdeg1 |      2623    .1578345    .3646553          0          1 
HofH no. of social security benefits 1995 |      2623    1.210827    1.172793          0          8 
HoH retired status 1995 = 1         ret1a |      2623    .2051087     .403858          0          1 
Predicted LTV 1995             ltv1 |      2446    .3710544    .4281343          0   7.636364 
Predicted LTV 2000             ltv6 |      2361     .247305    .3347003     -.7984       8.88 
Change predicted 1995-2000          ltv_c2 |      2302   -.1176397    .3762394  -7.207678   8.325833 
Constrained Group 1995            con1 |      2623    .1414411    .3485424          0          1 
(i.e. has LTV>0.8) 
con1 ltv_c1 interaction      con1ltv_c1 |      2302   -.0463848    .1519545  -1.908995   .1885867 
remortgage event  1995-2000    remort_t1 |      2623     .144491     .351654          0          1 
con1 rhsval interaction     con1rhsval_c |      2480    6.792339    27.73307        -27        478 
con1 rhsval tdebt1>£500     con_rhs_~500 |      2480    3.832381    21.07583      -12.5        360   44
Selected descriptive statistics: Unconstrained v. constrained households (latter defined as predicted LTV>0.8) 
Unconstrained households         Constrained households 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        age1 |      2252    50.37034    13.58258         20         89 
      tdebt1 |      2252    1.097174    3.899427          0     99.999 
      tdebt6 |      2252    1.471378    3.907612          0         75 
     tdebt_c |      2252    .3742038    4.743774    -74.999         75 
  totaldebt1 |      2252    21.81798    38.07192      -.009       1003 
  totaldebt6 |      2252    21.84362    42.47747      -.008        800 
 totaldebt_c |      2252    .0256416    44.53901  -1003.003        713 
     mort_1|     2077    19.81372     24.2018          0   249.6005 
     mort_6|     2089    19.71098    31.46576     -39.96   615.2924 
       mort1 |      2252    20.72081    37.21212      -.009       1000 
       mort6 |      2252    20.37224    41.42193      -.008        800 
     tvalue1 |      2250    84.24643    61.67272          2        685 
     tvalue6 |      2495    126537.6    115256.3       3000    1076000 
    tvalue_c |      2138    44.69345    82.88359       -546        891 
     rhsval1 |      2250    77.77021    53.18907          2        685 
     rhsval6 |      2139     118.022    92.15809          3        999 
    rhsval_c |      2138    44.69345    82.88359       -546        891 
      asset1 |      2252    16.41632    41.17992          0        830 
      asset6 |      2252    13.61061    39.05893          0        830 
     asset_c |      2252   -2.805707    8.910056     -129.3          0 
    tincome1 |      2252     20.4044    16.06274          0    297.602 
    tincome6 |      2252    23.05434    18.17924          0        209 
   tincome_c |      2252    2.649937     15.6631  -261.3746   179.6394 
       emp1a |      2252    .7349023    .4414832          0          1 
       emp6a |      2252    .6642984      .47234          0          1 
       emp_c |      2252   -.0706039    .3624868         -1          1 
       sex1a |      2252     .651865    .4764849          0          1 
       tdeg1 |      2252      .14254    .3496807          0          1 
 tnbenefits1 |      2252    1.289964    1.169669          0          8 
       ret1a |      2252    .2384547    .4262332          0          1 
       ltv1 |     2075    .2691589    .3796879          0   7.636364 
       ltv2 |     2021    .1838166     .307319     -.7984       8.88 
      ltv_c2 |      1962   -.0836028    .3817493  -7.207678   8.325833 
       con1  |      2252           0           0          0          0              
  con1ltv_c1 |      1884           0           0          0          0 
   remort_t1 |      2252    .1314387    .3379546          0        1                
con1rhsval_c |      2173           0           0          0          0 
con_rhs_~500 |      2173           0           0          0          0    
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       age   |   371     33.0027    7.360045         19         61 
      tdebt1 |       371    2.052809    3.738809          0         45 
      tdebt6 |       371    4.281695     8.32553          0        100 
     tdebt_c |       371    2.228887    7.848509      -17.5        100 
  totaldebt1 |       371    48.64662    30.78949      -.002      440.6 
  totaldebt6 |       371    56.26246    40.31174      -.008        278 
 totaldebt_c |       371    7.615841    43.72314    -396.55    277.001 
      mort_1 |   371    49.90675     20.5461     12.997        140 
      mort_6 |   369    55.83174    29.54385     -19.96    236.048 
       mort1 |       371    46.59381    30.08128      -.009        440 
       mort6 |       371    51.98077    38.10864      -.008        270 
     tvalue1 |       371    53.49177    21.98145         15        160 
     tvalue6 |       342    108.2474    88.34094         22        965 
    tvalue_c |       382     53737.3    81155.84    -152000     918000 
     rhsval1 |       371    53.36912    21.90354         15        160 
     rhsval6 |       342    102.6446    69.09994         22        500 
    rhsval_c |       342    49.25439     59.1083        -27        478 
      asset1 |       371    3.676814    13.31349          0        220 
      asset6 |       371     3.17159    12.85772          0        220 
     asset_c |       371   -.5052237    2.445049        -35          0 
    tincome1 |       371    24.43109    14.20824   1.340331   154.6163 
    tincome6 |       371    32.10969    26.48785          0   397.3198 
   tincome_c |       371    7.678598    19.88584  -74.34824   242.7034 
       emp1a |       371    .9568733    .2034166          0          1 
       emp6a |       371    .9514825    .2151472          0          1 
       emp_c |       371   -.0053908    .2437833         -1          1 
       sex1a |       371    .6981132    .4596964          0          1 
       tdeg1 |       371    .2506739    .4339863          0          1 
 tnbenefits1 |       371    .7304582    1.074327          0          8 
       ret1a |       371    .0026954    .0519174          0          1 
       ltv1  |       371    .9409552    .1388386         .8   1.909091 
       ltv2  |       340    .6246878    .2241349  -.1174118   1.294522 
      ltv_c2 |       340   -.3140523     .269105  -1.908995   .1885867 
        con1 |       371           1           0          1          1 
  con1ltv_c1 |       340   -.3140523     .269105  -1.908995   .1885867 
   remort_t1 |       371    .2237197    .4172991          0          1 
con1rhsval_c |       342    49.25439     59.1083        -27        478 
con_rhs_~500 |       342    27.79037    50.61049      -12.5        360 Working Paper List 2005 
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